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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee Doris Keating agrees with the statement of juris-
diction contained in Appellant Iola Patton's principal brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case, Course Of The Proceedings, And 
Disposition Below. 
Mrs. Patton filed this action against Mrs. Keating for 
personal injuries allegedly sustained in a rear-end automobile 
collision in January 1992. (R. 2). After a three-day trial in 
January 1995, the jury found Mrs. Keating fifty one per cent 
negligent and Mrs. Patton forty nine per cent negligent. (R. 86-
8, 189-90). The jury awarded $3,500.00 in damages. (R. 189-90). 
Mrs. Patton filed a motion for a new trial on the bases that 
the damages awarded were grossly inadequate and that the trial 
court improperly excluded a portion of her intended cross 
examination of Mrs. Keating. (R. 199-203). The trial court 
denied the motion and this appeal followed. (R. 231). 
B. Statement Of Facts. 
1. AFTER BEING INVOLVED IN A LOW-IMPACT COLLISION, 
MRS. PATTON FILED A LAWSUIT FOR OVER ONE MILLION 
DOLLARS. 
On January 14, 1992, Mrs. Patton drove a friend to the Lost 
Creek apartment complex in Murray. (R. 249, 280). She parked on 
the wrong side of a road in the complex, in a no-park area next 
to a curb, and remained in the car while her friend conducted 
business with a resident. (R. 282, 302). It was "pitch dark" at 
the time, and the condition of the road was icy and snow-covered. 
(R. 280, 282, 288, 314). 
Mrs. Keating had just dropped off a friend in another area 
of the apartment complex parking lot. (R. 311). As she was 
turning a corner to leave the complex, her car began to slide. 
(R. 313). She applied her brakes but slid into the rear of 
Mrs. Patton's vehicle. (R. 313). Mrs. Keating described the 
accident as unavoidable. (R. 318). Although Mrs. Patton main-
tained at trial that Mrs. Keating was speeding, Mrs. Keating's 
statement that she was travelling at a very low rate of speed, 
about five miles per hour, was confirmed by expert testimony and 
by the minimal amount of damage to the vehicles. (R. 210, 2 89, 
314-315). 
The parties exited their vehicles to inspect for damage and 
did not find any on either vehicle. (R. 288, 316). Mrs. Patton 
also stated that she was not hurt. (R. 316-17, 320). She subse-
quently filed a personal injury suit against Mrs. Keating seeking 
payment of alleged medical expenses and one million dollars in 
general damages. (R. 4). 
2. THE JURY DETERMINED THAT MRS. PATTON SUSTAINED 
$3,500.00 WORTH OF DAMAGE. 
Mrs. Patton claimed at trial that she was forced to drop out 
of Salt Lake Community College and lost a Pell Grant as a result 
of the accident. (R. 274, 278). She attempted to introduce 
evidence that she incurred medical expenses of $23,000.00, but it 
was excluded for lack of foundation. (Re 277-8). She introduced 
a physician's certification of permanent total disability, but 
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later admitted on cross examination that she worked out two hours 
a day at the Holiday Health Spa. (R. 278, 307). 
Mrs. Patton attempted to present expert testimony regarding 
the circumstances of the accident through Don Remington. 
(R. 211). However, Mr. Remington conceded on cross examination 
that he had limited knowledge about the accident, having only 
learned of it a few days before trial and having only learned 
Mrs. Patton's version of events. (R. 211). By contrast, expert 
accident reconstructionist Newell Knight testified for 
Mrs. Keating. (R. 210). He explained that the bumper and seats 
of Mrs. Patton's vehicle were designed to absorb force from a 
collision and thereby prevent injury. (R. 210-11). 
Two physicians testified at trial. (R. 212). Dr. Wood, who 
treated Mrs. Patton after the accident, diagnosed her with merely 
a lumbar spasm or strain. (R. 211). Dr. Foley noted that while 
Mrs. Patton reported "an acute onset of radiculopathy" following 
surgery unrelated to the accident, this condition was not con-
nected to the accident. (R. 211). Dr. Schwartz, who performed 
back surgery on Mrs. Patton after the accident, was not called to 
testify. (R. 211). All treating physicians agreed that their 
diagnosis relied heavily on the subjective symptoms reported by 
Mrs. Patton. (R. 212). 
At the close of evidence, counsel delivered their closing 
arguments. Mrs. Patton never objected to any portion of 
Mrs. Keating's closing argument. (R. 251-264). After the jury 
rendered its verdict awarding $3,500 in special damages and no 
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general damages, Mrs. Patton did not request that the jury be 
directed to reconsider the amount of special or general damages. 
(R. 213). 
Mrs. Patton filed a motion for a new trial shortly after-
wards, asserting only that the damages awarded were inadequate 
and contrary to the evidence, and that she should have been able 
to question Mrs. Keating regarding alcohol consumption merely 
because Mrs. Keating attended a Veteran of Foreign Wars function 
before the accident.1 (R. 199-203). The court denied the 
motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in 
precluding Mrs. Patton from questioning Mrs. Keating on alcohol 
consumption. Mrs. Patton had no foundation to pursue the line of 
questioning and made no viable proffer of admissible evidence. 
POINT II: The jury's assessment of fault and damages was well 
supported by the evidence presented. Mrs. Patton cannot receive 
a new trial simply because she did not receive a favorable 
outcome the first time around. 
POINT III: Mrs. Patton's attack on Mrs. Keating's closing 
argument, raised for the first time on appeal, lacks merit. The 
*Mrs. Patton attempted to ask Mrs. Keating on cross 
examination whether the Veterans of Foreign Wars served alcohol 
at functions. (R. 249). The trial court precluded questions 
regarding alcohol consumption on the grounds of unfair surprise 
and prejudice; Mrs. Patton did not raise the subject of alcohol 
consumption until trial, and there was no evidence that Mrs. 
Keating had been drinking. (R. 249-251). 
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closing argument did not violate the open courts provision. The 
last twenty minutes of the trial did nothing to erase the exis-
tence of Mrs. Patton's day, or three days, in court. Moreover, 
there was no constitutional infringement because there was no 
state action. Neither was the closing argument "grossly 
improper"; asking the jury to question whether a one million 
dollar verdict is warranted in light of the flimsy evidence 
presented lies well within the expansive boundaries of 
appropriate closing argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING 
A LINE OF QUESTIONING FOR WHICH THERE 
WAS NO GOOD FAITH BASIS. 
Although Mrs. Patton had absolutely no evidence that 
Mrs. Keating had been drinking before the accident, she none-
theless attempted to create that inference at trial by asking 
Mrs. Keating about the Veterans of Foreign Wars. It is a 
fundamental rule of cross-examination that parties cannot 
question witnesses about a subject without a good faith belief to 
support the questioning. The trial court acted properly in 
halting the fishing expedition. 
A. Mrs. Patton's Intended Line Of Questioning Lacked 
Foundation. 
The following exchange occurred during cross examination of 
Mrs. Keating: 
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Q: Now my understanding is that evening you had been at a 
meeting with the Veteran of Foreign Wars? 
A: The Foreign Wars, yes, Auxiliary. 
Q: Now do the Veterans of Foreign Wars, do they serve 
alcohol at their various functions? 
Mr. Lund: Objection, there's no evidence whatsoever of any 
alcohol consumption here and it's inappropriate for 
him to ask that now. 
The Court: I would sustain. (R. 249). 
The question was properly excluded for two reasons. First, 
it would have been wholly inadequate to support a reasonable 
inference that Mrs. Keating was under the influence of alcohol 
when the accident occurred. The only claimed "foundation" for 
this line of questioning is Mrs. Patton's assertion that the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars is "very well known" to serve alcoholic 
beverages. (Appellant's Brief at p. 16). She has never 
proffered affidavits or other evidence to establish this alleged 
fact. Yet she sought to imply to the jury from this unsupported 
fact that Mrs. Keating must have been drinking before the 
accident. The trial court appropriately prevented Mrs. Patton 
from using the bare assertion that the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
serves alcohol as a springboard to implying that Mrs. Keating was 
intoxicated. See State v. Sorenson, 619 P.2d 1185, 1191 (Mont. 
1980) (mere assumption of counsel that witness was under 
influence of drugs is insufficient foundation to ask about drug use).2 
2Mrs. Patton incorrectly cites Sorenson as support for her 
notion that questioning about alcohol use is always fair game. 
(Appellant's Brief at 15). The other cases cited for this notion 
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Second, Mrs. Patton intended to create this prejudicial 
inference without even knowing whether Mrs. Keating actually had 
consumed alcohol that evening. Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 103(2) 
(attached as Addendum A) provides that error may not be predi-
cated on a ruling which excludes evidence unless the substance of 
the excluded evidence has been made known to the court by an 
offer of proof. Mrs. Patton never submitted an offer of proof 
concerning Mrs. Keating's use of alcohol. Without this offer of 
proof, the court never had an opportunity to determine if there 
was specific admissible evidence regarding use of alcohol and 
properly excluded the line of questioning. See State v. Rammel, 
721 P.2d 298, 499 (Utah 1986); Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 
1240, 1243 (Utah 1980) (appellate court cannot say that exclusion 
of evidence was error without proffer). 
A party may not ask a witness a prejudicial question in 
front of the jury without having good-faith knowledge of what the 
answer is. In People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo. App. 
1990), defense counsel attempted to ask a rape victim questions 
about her prior sexual activities without knowing whether she had 
in fact been sexually promiscuous. Approving the trial court's 
exclusion of these questions, the court noted that counsel 
may not properly propound to a witness questions which 
can cause a doubt in the jury's mind as to the witness' 
are similarly unavailing. See State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 
(Utah 1977) (known heroin dealer could be asked about heroin 
use); State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990) (witness 
could be questioned about cocaine use for limited purpose of 
impeachment). 
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credibility when there is no reasonable basis in fact 
for that interrogation. 
804 P.2d at 223. 
Just as it would have been prejudicial to ask the rape victim in 
Vialpando whether she had been sexually promiscuous, it would 
have been inappropriate to ask Mrs. Keating if she had been 
drinking.3 Regardless of what the witness' answer might have 
been, an inference of drinking would have been already been 
created by the mere asking of the inflammatory question. See 
Lily v. Scott, 598 P.2d 279, 283 n.3 (Okla. App. 1979) (improper 
questions having for their sole purpose the casting of 
reflections upon the character of witnesses is prejudicial 
conduct). 
B. Mrs. Patton Has Not Demonstrated That The Preclusion, If 
Improper, Had A Substantial Effect On The Trial's Outcome. 
Even if this Court determines that Mrs. Patton should have 
been allowed to question Mrs. Keating without foundation and 
without a good faith basis, a new trial is still unwarranted. 
Improperly excluded evidence becomes reversible error only if it 
can be shown that the exclusion had a substantial effect on the 
trial's outcome. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 
796 (Utah 1991). 
Mrs. Patton has not suggested, much less demonstrated, that 
a different outcome would have been probable had she questioned 
3As a practical reality, Mrs. Patton obtained this prejudi-
cial effect by, without reasonable notice, asking Mrs. Keating 
whether the Veterans of Foreign Wars served alcohol. 
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Mrs. Keating about alcohol consumption. To the contrary, evi-
dence that Mrs. Keating consumed alcohol before the accident, if 
it had any effect at all, would have weighed upon Mrs. Keating's 
degree of negligence. Even if Mrs. Patton could prove that the 
jury would have found Mrs. Keating 100% negligent had she been 
able to pursue her line of questioning, damages would have 
remained $3500.00. Mrs. Keating would have then been responsible 
for the entire damages amount rather than just 51% of it, but the 
damages still would have been "grossly inadequate," as Mrs. 
Patton calls them. Mrs. Patton complains on appeal that the 
jury's damages award was grossly inadequate compared to the 
amount of injury she suffered, yet evidence of intoxication 
properly could only have affected amount of liability, not 
damages. Mrs. Patton has done nothing to suggest, as is her 
burden, that the outcome would have been different had she been 
permitted to question about alcohol consumption. Instead, any 
error on the part of the trial court was harmless. 
This Court should not order a new trial on the basis of the 
limited cross examination. The trial court, in a unique position 
to assess the relevance and prejudicial effect of evidence, acted 
properly in preventing the unsubstantiated and inflammatory 
interrogation from reaching the jury. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
Mrs. Patton's bald assertion that the verdict lacked any 
support in the evidence is meritless. In her one-page "argument" 
that the evidence was insufficient, she simply notes that when a 
verdict is "obviously unreasonable and unjust," the appellate 
court may reverse it. (Appellant's Brief at 16-17). However, 
she fails to explain how the verdict in this case was 
unreasonable and unjust, leaving this Court nothing to review for 
injustice. 
A. Mrs. Patton Has Failed To Marshal The Evidence. 
A jury verdict may be reversed only if, "viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is no 
substantial evidence to support it." In re Estate of Kesler, 702 
P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985). An appellant challenging a jury verdict 
must marshal all evidence supporting the verdict and show that 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. W. Fiberglass v. 
Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 (Utah App. 1990); 
Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990). 
Mrs. Patton has not made the necessary showing. Rather than 
marshalling the evidence, her brief does not list one scintilla 
of evidence the jury could have relied on in reaching its ver-
dict. Furthermore, she does not: point to any evidence detracting 
from the verdict. She broadly suggests that the low damages 
award could not have been supported by any evidence because she 
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feels she suffered serious injury. Her attack on the liability 
assessment is similarly vacuous; she asserts the jury completely 
ignored liability because it was riveted on Mrs. Keating's "cold, 
calculated" closing argument. (Appellant's Brief at 17). 
Mrs. Patton has neither marshalled the evidence for or against 
the verdict. 
Mrs. Patton's "argument" against the jury verdict is unsub-
stantiated rhetoric. It lacks facts, it lacks legal authority 
and it lacks legal analysis. Appellate Rule of Procedure 24(a) 
requires appellate briefs to contain arguments. Mrs. Patton's 
page worth of assertions is insufficient to create an issue 
reviewable on appeal. See English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 
P.2d 613, 618-9 (Utah App. 1991) (court declined to consider 
issues raised on appeal for failure to comply with Rule 24). 
B. There Is Substantial Evidence To Support The Verdict. 
The jury drew upon substantial evidence to support its 
finding that Mrs. Keating was only 51% negligent. The evidence 
at trial showed this accident to be unavoidable on Mrs. Keating's 
part. The jury heard evidence, both expert and lay, that she was 
travelling slowly as she negotiated a turn in an icy parking lot 
at night. When she saw Mrs. Patton's vehicle parked just around 
the corner, she braked but inevitably slid into her. The jury 
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also heard evidence that Mrs. Patton was parked the wrong way in 
a no-park zone.4 
Evidence that the accident was not serious was also 
introduced. There seemed to be no damage to either vehicle 
immediately after the accident, and Mrs. Patton said she was not 
hurt. The doctor who performed surgery on her back was not there 
to testify about why the surgery was necessary. The two doctors 
who did testify could not link any current impairment to the 
accident. 
Considering the evidence received, the jury's verdict was 
not surprising. Mrs. Patton cannot prove that there was no 
evidence to support it simply by stating that the jury should 
have decided differently. 
POINT III 
MRS. KEATING'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
WAS PROPER. 
Mrs. Patton lodges an inaccurate and untimely allegation 
that Mrs. Keating's closing argument represented "gross 
misconduct." This Court should reject the last argument on 
appeal. 
4Mrs. Patton contests for the first time on appeal the 
insufficiency of the verdict based on fault apportionment. Her 
motion for new trial only protested the insufficiency of damages. 
Since Mrs. Patton did not present the issue of whether the jury 
had sufficient evidence to apportion fault the way it did, this 
Court should not address that issue. 
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A. Mrs. Patton Cannot Criticize The Closing Argument For 
The First Time On Appeal. 
During Mrs. Keating's entire closing argument, Mrs. Patton 
never objected. She never moved for a mistrial based on a 
prejudicial closing argument. As Mrs. Keating supposedly inun-
dated the jury with "the highest degree of prejudice possible," 
Mrs. Patton let the argument continue uninterrupted. 
Her failure to object contemporaneously to the closing 
argument precludes her from objecting now. As the court in 
Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990), 
explained: 
If something occurs which the party thinks is wrong and 
so prejudicial to him that he thereafter cannot have a 
fair trial, he must make his objection promptly and 
seek redress by moving for a mistrial, or by having 
cautionary instructions given, if that is adequate, or 
be held to waive whatever rights may have existed to do 
so. Otherwise, it would be manifestly unjust to permit 
a party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial 
error has been committed, and then if he loses, come 
forward claiming error. 
787 P.2d at 527, quoting Hill v. Cloward. 377 P.2d 186, 188 
(Utah 1962) . 
It is well-established that an issue not preserved at the trial 
level cannot be considered on appeal.5 State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358 (Utah App. 1993). Mrs. Keating requests that this Court 
disregard the last three points raised in Mrs. Patton's brief for 
untimeliness. 
5Because Mrs. Patton does not comply with Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A), it is impossible to tell where, 
if anywhere, she believes she preserved this issue with 
sufficient specificity. 
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B. Mrs. Keating's Closing Comments Fell Well Within The 
Wide Latitudes Allowed During Closing Argument. 
Counsel enjoy considerable latitude in closing arguments. 
They have a "right to discuss fully from their standpoints the 
evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom." 
State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988), cert, denied 
112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992). 
Mrs. Keating's closing argument was appropriate in all 
respects. It summarized the relevant evidence, including the 
facts that the accident was not immediately reported, that 
Mrs. Patton said she was not hurt, that Mrs. Patton was parked 
close to the corner in a no-park zone, that weather conditions 
were poor, and that the impact was slight (R. 253-6) . Counsel 
highlighted the pertinent medical evidence as well, reminding the 
jurors that the two testifying doctors could not link her current 
problems to the accident. (R. 257-261). The closing argument 
did not violate the Golden Rule, as Mrs. Patton asserts; counsel 
never urged the jurors to place themselves in the defendant's 
position. Neither was the closing argument a diatribe for tort 
reform in this nation, as Mrs. Patton contends; rather, counsel 
asked the jury to consider whether such a low-speed collision 
could result in damages of over one million dollars. (R. 255). 
Simply because the jury considered the question in Mrs. Keating's 
favor does not mean the closing argument was grossly prejudicial. 
Finally, Mrs. Patton cannot cite any caselaw showing that 
the particular comments she complains of warrant a new trial. In 
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the only case she can find where a closing argument was deter-
mined to be improper, the Supreme Court determined that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based 
on counsel's remarks that the defendant was a giant company and 
that the plaintiff had made reasonable efforts to resolve the 
dispute before trial but the defendant refused. In affirming the 
trial court in that case, the court recognized its duty to accord 
great deference to the trial court's unique position to observe 
whether the jury had been prejudiced by these remarks. Donohue 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 
19 87). The comments in Donohue are unlike those in Mrs. Keating's 
closing argument, where counsel simply requested that the jury 
consider the plausibility of a one million dollar verdict in 
light of the evidence presented. 
C. The Closing Argument Did Not Violate The Open Court 
Provision Of The Utah Constitution. 
Mrs. Patton's final grievance with the closing argument is 
that it violated the open courts provision. Notwithstanding 
Mrs. Keating's closing argument, Mrs. Patton still had her day, 
or three days, in court. To the extent she may be claiming that 
the closing argument sapped her case of its strength, she had the 
opportunity to present a rebuttal argument afterwards to rehabil-
itate her case. 
The argument that Mrs. Keating's argument violated consti-
tutional rights also must fail because there is no state action. 
Mrs. Keating is not an arm of the state, and neither is her 
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counsel. Only the government or its actors can violate a 
citizen's constitutional rights. Nielson v. Central Waterworks 
Co., 645 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Patton has not presented any reason for this Court to 
grant a new trial. Cross examination was appropriately limited, 
the verdict was supported by the evidence, and the closing 
argument was proper. Paring down her various arguments to their 
core, her message seems to be that she deserves a new trial 
because she was not pleased with the outcome in the original 
trial. Because this is not a proper reason for a new trial, 
Mrs. Keating respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. 
DATED this /£x day of August, 1995. . ^ 
SNOW, GHRlSTENSfiN 8C MARTINEAU 
rahnxR. Lund 
'JiilTianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A; 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admit-
ting evidence, a timely objection or motion to 
strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context, or 
(2» Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which ques-
tions were asked 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may 
add any other or further statement which shous the 
character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon It 
ma> direct the making of an offer in question and 
answer form 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the jury by any means, such as making statements 
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of 
the jury 
(d> Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court 
ADDENDUM B: 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appel-
lant shall contain under appropriate headings and in 
the order indicated: 
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceed-
ing in the court or agency whose judgment or 
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the 
caption of the case on appeal contains the names 
of all such parties. The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside 
the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents 
of the addendum, with page references. 
(3> A table of authorities with cases alphabeti-
cally arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction 
of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for re-
view, including for each issue, the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(Bi a statement of grounds for seeking re-
view of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court 
(6> Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordi-
nances, rules, and regulations whose interpreta-
tion is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal shall be set out verba-
tim with the appropriate citation If the pertinent 
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone 
will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in 
an addendum to the brief under paragraph 111) of 
this rule. 
(7• A statement of the case. The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow. 
All statements of fact and references to the pro-
ceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of 
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a suc-
cinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in 
the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise re-
lief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement 
that no addendum is necessary under this para-
graph. The addendum shall be bound as part of 
the brief unless doing so makes the brief unrea-
sonably thick. If the addendum is bound sepa-
rately, the addendum shall contain a table of con-
tents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, 
rule, or regulation of central importance 
cited in the brief but not reproduced verba-
tim in the brief; 
(B» any court opinion of central impor-
tance to the appeal but not available to the 
court as part of a regularly published re-
porter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal 
that are of central importance to the deter-
mination of the appeal, such as the chal-
lenged instructions, findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, memorandum decision, the 
transcript of the court's oral decision, or the 
contract or document subject to construction. 
